The Germans were no democrats until, defeated by democratic armies, they had no other choice, the old tale of Germany’s peculiar path towards liberal democracy read. In recent years, we have learned much about the presence and seeming naturalness of democratic practices under the canopy of the monarchic regime. Yet, German democratic political theorists of the German Empire, whether liberal or socialist, remain in the shadows. The protestant theologian, historian, and philosopher Ernst (Peter Wilhelm) Troeltsch (1865–1923), protagonist of Robert E. Norton’s new book, was one of these theorists.

Norton’s is the first study dedicated entirely to Troeltsch’s political work and thought during the First World War. The aim, in short, is to reconstruct how Germany became a parliamentary democracy in the autumn of 1918, and to revaluate Troeltsch’s place within this process. Having moved from Heidelberg to Berlin early in 1915 to take up a prestigious chair in philosophy, Troeltsch „did not just comment on, he also actively participated in some of the key political events of the day“, Norton explains. Troeltsch’s publications and political work thus provide „an unusually direct and intimate perspective“ on the intellectual battles over democracy during the war (p. XIV).

Overall, Norton follows a chronological order, setting out with the European declarations of war in the summer of 1914 and closing with the revolution of 1918/19. To begin with, he reminds the reader that the well-established narrative of all-encompassing German war enthusiasm in July and August 1914 was, in truth, a myth successfully built and nourished by some of the contemporary press. Such revisionist undercurrent is noticeable throughout Norton’s book: in line with many previous studies, he highlights the diversity of wartime discourse in Germany instead of insinuating war fever and unreserved nationalism throughout.1 Admittedly, a revaluation of Troeltsch’s philosophically ambitious, fascinating wartime writings is, as such, a highly worthwhile undertaking and could forego the teleological rhetoric that has come to characterize some of the revisionist historiography. Analysing Troeltsch’s speeches and publications of the first weeks of the war, Norton explains how, at this point, most Germans – among them Troeltsch – assumed that their nation was under attack and could not but defend herself. Considering this context was crucial to properly evaluate any nationalist rhetoric of the time. What seems far more important and interesting, however, is the fact that Troeltsch advocated for the achievement of greater political freedom, that is, democracy, as the imperative consequence of the war as early as August 1914. To him, this was the only way to compensate for the sacrifice many, above all soldiers and their families, would have to make for their nation.

At the same time, the international press embarked upon a campaign against Germany that was led in the name of civilization versus barbarism, and, later on, democracy versus autocracy. Norton rightly emphasises that democratic German intellectuals of the time found their political work undermined by such oversimplifications. Troeltsch’s response lay in „erecting a defensive line against the Allied propaganda campaign“ (p. 129) by, again and again, defining the essence of German culture and history as centered around the value of freedom and, for that matter, a particularly sophisticated reading of the notion of freedom. Troeltsch defined this so-called „German freedom“ as directed towards the „unlimited diversity of personal self-cultivation and self-expression“. „The only way to achieve genuine freedom“, he argued, „[was] for the individual to find a place and purpose within a larger community, and for that community to protect the flourishing of the individuals within it“ (p. 147). For example, individual duties should form the cornerstone of the constitution to come. „Freedom is not equality, but rather service of the individual in the place assigned to him in the governing organ“, Norton quotes his protagonist (p. 351). Practically, Germany could only sustainably achieve democracy if she found a way to implement such constitution according to her very own tradition of freedom. However, to Troeltsch, duties should not replace rights but add to them. Simply put, his „German democracy“ had more to offer than the democracies of the „West“.

On 27 January 1916 Troeltsch was given the honor to speak on the occasion of the emperor’s birthday on behalf of the University of Berlin. This speech revealed the questions with which the scholar Troeltsch was grappling during the war, Norton tells us. Somewhat unfittingly for the occasion, Troeltsch discussed how to reconcile historicism and philosophy of history, relativity, and universality. Yet even this seemingly purely philosophical quest was closely connected to the political turmoil of the day: like no other event experienced by contemporaries, the war challenged the belief in reasonable historical progress. People across Europe searched desperately for the possible meaning of the ongoing slaughtering of their soldiers. For Troeltsch, his political philosophy provided a provisional answer. Speaking before the Berlin elite that regularly gathered in the stately premises of the Deutsche Gesellschaft 1914, the theologian held what is probably his best-known speech, entitled „The Ideas of 1914“, pointing to the political rediscovery of the ideal of freedom in the Kantian, Fichtean, or Hegelian sense as the only meaningful way out of the war for the Germans. Through the experience of the war, in other words, and being accused as fundamentally unfree abroad, the Germans had finally arrived at the recognition that they were „free in their own way, in accordance with their own history, their own traditions and beliefs“ and, thus, „just as free as the English or the French“ (p. 280).

And yet, any optimism for inner reform that Troeltsch displayed in his 1916 writings faded almost completely following the US’s declaration of war against Germany in the name of democracy. Wilson’s 2 April 1917 speech before Congress once again identified Germany with despotism and inhumanity and displayed complete disregard for her own democratic tradition, ultimately playing into the hands of nationalist forces within the country. „Wilson’s words and actions actually made it easier for the German antagonists of democracy to portray those of their fellow countrymen who were pressing for it as the unconscious agents or stooges of a foreign power“, Norton writes critically (p. 384). In such lines, the increasing ideological radicalism characterising public discourse in Germany from 1916 onwards becomes palpable. Norton’s analyses help immensely to understand how Bethmann Hollweg’s Burgfrieden policy only temporarily concealed the fact that the advocates and opponents of democracy were increasingly unable to speak to each other.

Following the chancellor’s departure from office in July 1917 and the founding of the nationalist, annexionist Deutsche Vaterlandspartei, those continuing to rally for a negotiated peace at the nearest possible date and for the democratization of Germany founded the so-called Volksbund für Freiheit und Vaterland, a phrase echoing Troeltsch’s leading wartime thesis that freedom and patriotism were the two key elements to guide Germany out of her current predicament. The theologian was indeed one of the leading figures of this initiative. The Volksbund, although of very little immediate impact, for the first time „encouraged a sufficiently broad and diverse array of people in Germany to come to believe that democracy was desirable“, Norton explains the significance of the association (p. 452). In what way, then, did Troeltsch’s work pave the way for Germany to become a democracy in October 1918 and, again, in November 1918? „It was not the revolution that had been responsible for delivering that remarkable outcome, nor had it been brought about by the abdication of the Kaiser […] nor had democracy been merely the inadvertent consequence of the cynical scheming of Ludendorff and his cohort“, Norton concludes. „Instead, it was the result of years of highly complex developments and of deliberate, conscious struggles, many long predating the war“ (p. 542).

Careful analyses of ideological nuances too often give way to such sweeping statements in Norton’s important book. Regrettably, one occasionally loses sight of the protagonist over historical detail that most specialist readers will be familiar with. Norton’s study is, thus, not a book for those aiming to understand the philosophical fineries of Troeltsch’s political thought. Yet it is indispensable to properly evaluate the historical context of his often-misunderstood wartime writings and to appreciate the complexities and risks of imagining democracy for a nation at war. Some Germans were democrats, we learn from Norton and his protagonist, and, not rarely, at the great personal cost of being undermined and forgotten abroad and attacked as traitors at home.

Note:
1 See, most notably, Steffen Bruendel, Volksgemeinschaft oder Volkstaat. Die „Ideen von 1914“ und die Neuordnung Deutschlands im Ersten Weltkrieg, Berlin 2003; or Marcus Llanque, Demokratisches Denken im Krieg. Die deutsche Debatte im Ersten Weltkrieg, Berlin 2000.